Amidst the ongoing tug-of-war and tensions between the United States and Iran, Washington is seeking to enhance its military presence in the Gulf region in order to monitor crucial maritime passages. In July, it announced its intention to deploy a destroyer and F-35 and F-16 fighter jets. Furthermore, in the first week of August, reports emerged that the US military is considering putting Marines on commercial ships travelling through the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, the U.S. Fifth Fleet, on August 7, announced that more than 3,000 American sailors and Marines landed in the Middle East.

Over the past four decades, military reinforcements and confrontations have always characterized tensions between the US and Iran, which varied in intensity, waxing and waning according to the status of their relations. However, this time, the latest development seems different in one specific aspect- setting a precedent of deploying American armed personnel on commercial vessels. The whole situation raises questions about the motivations and implications of Washington’s reinforcement of its military presence in the region, as well as the stance of the Gulf states towards these developments.

Multiple Interpretations

There are several motives through which the recent American military actions in the region can be outlined as follows:

1. US belated re-assessment:

Washington's deployment of additional military forces to the Middle East and the potential deployment of armed sailors on commercial ships travelling through the Arabian Gulf can be interpreted through different perspectives. From the Gulf’s perspective, the question is whether President Joe Biden’s Administration has begun to reassess its policies pursued towards the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, or GCC. This comes after successive US administrations became certain that the six Gulf Arab states had begun to engage as rivals to American global influence in shaping international policies. Moreover, Gulf states demonstrated their ability to contain the Iranian threat, having Tehran as a partner working with them towards the region's development following the historic China-brokered agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran last March.

2. Psychological warfare against Iran:

There is nothing new about sending military reinforcements to bolster the presence of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, including the deployment of naval vessels, especially after the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ escalated speed-boat attacks on ships and oil tankers. Washington always adopts a traditional political discourse that aims to reassure allied Gulf countries about maintaining regional security. However, this discourse has been put to test in numerous situations experienced by the Gulf nations, especially during the US Democratic administrations, which eventually has shaken trust in Washington. In one such situation, the United States disregarded the Gulf’s interests in negotiations with Iran and then concluded the landmark nuclear agreement with Iran in 2015. Additionally, Washington took a negative stance towards armed militias threatening Gulf security. Consequently, it is likely that American actions may merely serve as pressure tactics against Tehran to achieve progress on the nuclear dossier. The experience of Democratic administrations in dealing with Iran shows that they adopt a cautious approach towards it.

3. Preparation for the 2024 US elections:

Thanks to significant developments in the region, one of the most complex crises has been somewhat mitigated. This pertains to the restoration of relations between Riyadh and Tehran, which undoubtedly had a negative impact on the image of the Democrats domestically and also on Washington's role in the Middle East. Consequently, President Joe Biden might attempt to boost his popularity before the upcoming presidential election, scheduled for November 2024. On the one hand, he aims to assure American voters that their country continues to pursue a strategy ensuring its global superiority. On the other hand, he seeks to rectify signals from Washington indicating its commitment to countering the Iranian threat in the region. This matter is also linked to the electoral process, given Israel's stance and the pro-Israel lobby within the US, which exerts pressure on the Biden administration. This pressure is especially pronounced due to the strained relationship with the current Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu, who may make efforts to incite Jewish pressure groups against Biden and his administration.

Calculated Escalation

Several potential repercussions of sending US military reinforcements to the Middle East to deter Iranian threats against commercial ships can be highlighted as follows:

1. Avoiding direct military confrontation:

Historical tensions exist between the US forces deployed to the region and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC. The recent US actions bring to mind the so-called Tanker War during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. However, the current confrontation between Washington and Tehran is unlikely to escalate into a full-scale war, as the presence of warships or military forces doesn't necessarily indicate an all-out confrontation. This is particularly true as Washington began reducing its operational presence in the region in 2018.

On the other hand, Iran is keen to avoid the possibility of direct military confrontation with the US. This approach was put to test before and was evidenced in Iran's response to the killing of General Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, and his deputy Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, in January 2020. At that time, Tehran responded only through verbal escalation and threats, coupled with minor skirmishes, including a limited missile strike of an unknown source on an Iraqi military base housing US troops. This indicates that both the Americans and the Iranians are not inclined towards actual escalation and practically steer clear of direct confrontation.

2. Escalation of tensions in the region:

The most likely scenario involves a surge in political and military posturing, accompanied by the deployment of a rhetoric of threat and a war of words between the US and Iran. There is also a potential for the United States to activate both internal and external Iranian opposition elements in order to exert pressure on Iranian negotiators. This does not rule out the possibility of Tehran responding with provocative actions against foreign vessels in the region, as well as abducting citizens of other countries. Additionally, there is a potential for Iran to export some of its domestic unrest to crisis-afflicted nations in the region.

Both Washington and Tehran realize the cost of war for them. Just as their understanding during normal times is complicated due to disagreement about numerous issues, this complexity would intensify in the event of a war between them. The US understands that reverting to a tanker war in the region would deepen the ongoing oil crisis worldwide, which would likely amplify global anger as well as Europeans’ resentment toward their ally, potentially even causing domestic discontent within the United States. Such circumstances could impact the fate of the Democratic Party and Biden himself in the upcoming elections.

Gulf Calculations

A traditional notion echoed by some regarding the Iranian-Gulf relations suggests that they are linked to the US-Iranian relations. While this notion held more validity before recent Gulf agreements with Iran, some might attempt to invoke this concept once again in these times, especially after the meeting between Jassim Al-Bedaiwi, the Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), US 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces, on August 3. However, due to the absence of specific statements from both sides following this meeting, and considering that the GCC secretary general is a politician and not a military commander, and given the fact that the Gulf Cooperation Council, as a regional organization, has never been a party to any US military actions in the Gulf, the meeting can be described as procedural in nature, as it has no connection to a Gulf role or participation in what could be seen as American "intentions" to engage in a confrontation with Iran.

It can therefore be said that the Gulf countries distance themselves from US steps or signals of escalation in the region for various reasons, including the following:

1. Gulf perception of US actions:

The recent US military measures in the region, according to the conviction of the Gulf, are seen as a form of US usual diplomatic pressure on Iran to push forward a certain agenda. Here, the focus is on the nuclear negotiations, as any success would represent a political gain for the Biden administration, currently gearing up for the presidential elections. His administration is seeking tangible achievements on both the external and internal fronts. Consequently, the Gulf countries fully recognize the reality of Washington's stances, signals, and the limits of its actual actions in the region.

2. Keeping the approach to the Gulf unchanged:

Numerous past instances confirm the presence of a consistent American approach aimed at appeasing Gulf nations and garnering their support for Washington's moves and policies in the region. This approach remains within the realm of political statements and positions, regardless of how intense or assertive they may become. They remain confined to the realm of diplomacy and have never been put into real actions, even in situations where such action was required and even inevitable. Unlike the recurring US withdrawals from the region, the Gulf cannot forget the "US silence" about the Houthi terrorist attacks against Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

3. Shift in the Gulf’s approach:

In recent years, the Gulf foreign policy has been characterized by a reconciliatory stance towards all parties, with the aim being "zero out problems," even with Iran, which occupies three Emirati islands, Greater and Lesser Tunbs, and Abu Musa, and is already in disputes with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait over the Dorra field. This Gulf approach shift can be interpreted through two dynamics:

A. Strengthening the economy and developing avenues for cooperation with Iran and other countries might serve as a catalyst for future understandings over sensitive and contentious political or security issues.

B. Demonstrating goodwill and adhering to a policy of long-term self-restraint and balanced de-escalation serve as an important and effective approach for engaging with the Iranian regime. This is of paramount significance because Iran has recently espoused openness to its Arab neighbors and showed a desire to improve relations. Consequently, there is no Gulf rationale for taking positions or adopting measures that might be used by Tehran as excuses to obstruct regional de-escalation efforts.

In conclusion, despite all that has been discussed herein, Gulf states are unlikely to isolate or distance themselves from any actual developments in the region, especially within their immediate neighborhood. They are the most affected by any negative or positive shifts in relations between the United States and Iran. This is particularly true as Tehran pursues a policy of countering Washington by threatening its interests and allies in the region.